Legal Insight · Constitutional & Administrative Law

DOES THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE RIGHTS CONTRIBUTE TO THE BLURRING OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN REVIEW AND APPEAL?

Tshepahalo Masakoana
LLB Wits | LLM UCT (Constitutional and Administrative Law)
Director, Legal Consultant & Legal Educator, Masakoana Law

I. INTRODUCTION

South Africa is a constitutional democracy. This constitutional democracy is based on three main arms: the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary. At the heart of our constitutional democracy lies the principle of separation of powers which dictates that each arm must not encroach on the terrain of the other arms of government.1 As there is no absolute separation of powers,2 intrusion of one arm of government in the domain of the other arms is unsurprisingly inevitable.3 The courts are empowered to judicially review administrative action which is inconsistent with the Constitution.4 However, in the interpretation and application of administrative justice rights, the judiciary has been criticized for blurring the distinction between appeal and review.5 Consequently, the purpose of this essay is to critically assess the judiciary’s contribution (if any) to the blurring of the distinction between appeal and review when the judiciary interprets and applies the rights to administrative justice, and how this has affected the principle of separation of powers. This essay consists of two major sections. The first section discusses the principle of separation of powers. This discussion is important because it lays out the relationship between the three arms of government and situates the position, the power, and responsibilities of the Judiciary. This will set a conceptual and legal context against which the investigation on the blurring of the distinction between review and appeal will be undertaken. The second major section addresses the core of this essay’s purpose.

1 Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (CCT35/99) [2000] ZACC 8; 2000 (3) SA 936; 2000 (8) BCLR 837, (Dawood) para 17.

2 Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (CCT 23/96) [1996] ZACC 26; 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC); 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC); (1996) 17 ILJ 821 (CC), (Certification case) para 108.

3 Certification case, para 109.

4 Section 6 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.

5 G Penfold Towards a substantive conception of the scope of administrative-law review in South Africa PhD thesis (Wits University, Johannesburg) 2020 71.

II. SEPARATION OF POWERS: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE, EXECUTIVE AND THE JUDICIARY

The principle of separation of powers seeks to decentralize power and apportion it among the three arms of government.6 The purpose of this apportionment is to prevent any one of the arms of government from abusing power or maladministration.7 One of the primary duties of the Legislature is to pass legislation.8 The primary duties of the Executive include the implementation of national legislation and the development and implementation of national policy. At the heart of the principle of separation of powers are the checks and balances which prevent the arms of government from usurping power from one another.9 Checks and balances demand that arms of government, especially Courts, must not attribute to themselves superior wisdom in respect of matters entrusted to other branches of government.10 Visibly, there are different three major governmental actions: legislative, executive (or administrative) and judicial actions. I turn now to address each of them.

Legislative function

In UDM v Speaker,11 the Constitutional Court held that Parliament is elected ‘to represent the people and to ensure government by the people under the Constitution’12 and to fulfill our constitutional objectives on our behalf.13 Parliament is a ‘deliberative legislative body whose members are elected and the decisions taken by them are influenced by political considerations for which they are politically accountable to the electorate.’14 The making of laws by Parliament follows a process of deliberation which ‘ordinarily takes place in the assembly in public where the

6 P Labuschagne ‘Trias politica as guiding constitutional principle in the modern state: Obsolete relic or constitutional necessity?’ Politeia Vol 25 No. 1, 18 – 29, 20.

7 G.E Devenish ‘The doctrine of separation of powers with special reference to events in South Africa and Zimbabwe.’ Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins Hollandse Reg 66 (1), 85.

8 Section 44 of the Constitution.

9 S v Dodo [2001] ZACC 16; 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC); 2001 (5) BCLR 423 (CC), para 14.

10 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others (CCT 27/03) [2004] ZACC 15; 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC); 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC), para 48.

11 United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (CCT89/17) [2017] ZACC 21; 2017 (8) BCLR 1061 (CC); 2017 (5) SA 300 (CC) (UDM v Speaker).

12 Ibid, para 9.

13 Ibid, para 3.

14 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others (CCT7/98) [1998] ZACC 17; 1999 (1) SA 374; 1998 (12) BCLR 1458, para 41.

members articulate their own views on the subject of the proposed resolutions’.15 On this basis, the Constitutional Court correctly concluded that the legislative acts of Parliament cannot be challenged through administrative law as they do not constitute administrative action.16

Executive functions

While legislative acts are not administrative action, Professor Hoexter convincingly argues that ‘many legislative acts require administrative action for their application’ and to ‘that extent, may be regarded as incomplete administrative acts and their completion may well lead to legal challenges in the form of judicial review’.17 In Grey’s Marine,18 the court astutely held that

’administrative action is rather, in general terms, the conduct of the bureaucracy in carrying out the daily functions of the state which necessarily involves the application of policy, usually after its translation into law, with direct and immediate consequences for individuals or groups of individuals.’19

The Executive arm of government is the bureaucracy. However, the Executive oftentimes exercises power in a way that constitutes executive action, and this occurs in the form of formulating policy.20 The Constitutional Court has described executive powers as high-policy powers, and administrative powers as low-level powers.21 Consequently, it is important to identify whether the exercise of power amounts to administrative or executive action. This identification serves to determine whether an exercise of power is reviewable under administrative law or not, as administrative law review only applies where the exercise of power is administrative action.22 The standard of judicial review under administrative law is very high and might be inappropriate for sensitive matters that can best be dealt with by the Executive and to which the courts must show

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid, para 42.

17 C Hoexter and G Penfold Administrative Law in South Africa 3 ed (2021) 71 – 2.

18 Greys Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Public Works and Others (347/2004) [2005] ZASCA 43; [2005] 3 All SA 33 (SCA); 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA); 2005 (10) BCLR 931 (SCA).

19 Ibid, para 24.

20 Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others (CCT 133/13) [2014] ZACC 18; 2014 (8) BCLR 930 (CC); 2014 (5) SA 69 (CC), (Motau) para 37.

21 Ibid.

22 Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (CCT 59/2004) [2005] ZACC 14; 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC); 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC), para 583.

deference as required by the principle of separation of powers.23 Professor Hoexter’s conception of judicial deference has been citied with approval by the Courts.24 She explained judicial deference as

A judicial willingness to appreciate the legitimate and constitutionally-ordained province of administrative agencies; to admit the expertise of those agencies in policy-laden or polycentric issues…This type of deference is perfectly consistent with a concern for individual rights and a refusal to tolerate corruption and maladministration. It ought to be shaped not by an unwillingness to scrutinize administration action, but by a careful weighing up of the need for – and the consequences of – judicial intervention. Above all, it ought to be shaped by a conscious determination not to usurp the functions of administrative agencies; not to cross over from review to appeal.’25

Consistently with this explanation, the Supreme Court Appeal has held that judicial deference ‘does not imply judicial timidity or an unreadiness to perform the judicial function. It simply manifests the recognition that the law itself places certain administrative actions in the hands of the executive, not the judiciary’.26 Strikingly, the Constitutional Court held that while the separation of powers is integral to constitutional democracy, it provides no basis for a court to avoid its constitutional obligations.27 Consonantly, in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers,28 the Constitutional Court held that ‘administrative law, … is an incident of the separation of powers under which courts regulate and control the exercise of public power by the other branches of government’.29

Therefore, a court has a duty to regulate and ensure that the exercise of power by other arms of government is within the confines of the Constitution. In Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance,30 the Constitutional Court rightly held that courts must not usurp the powers entrusted to other

23 Motau, para 43.

24 Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO and Others 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA), para 21 – 22.

25 C Hoexter ‘The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law (2000) 117 SALJ 484, 501 – 502.

26 Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd and Another (32/2003, 40/2003) [2003] ZASCA 46; [2003] 2 All SA 616 (SCA); 2003 (6) SA 407 (SCA), para 50.

27 Mwelase and Others v Director-General for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform and Another (CCT 232/18) [2019] ZACC 30; 2019 (11) BCLR 1358 (CC); 2019 (6) SA 597 (CC), para 36.

28 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa 2000

(2) SA 674 (CC).

29 Ibid, para 45.

30 National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others (CCT 38/12) [2012] ZACC 18; 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC); 2012 (11) BCLR 1148 (CC).

branches of government by making decisions of their own preference.31 This strikes at the heart of this essay’s concern to which I now turn.

III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE RIGHTS TO ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE

a) Distinction between appeal and review

On the distinction between review and appeal, Lord Kerr held that, an appeal ‘involves an examination of what decision should be taken in the dispute between the parties’.32 Distinguishing appeal from review, Lord Hoffman stated that a review is ‘concerned with the legality rather than the merits of the decision, with the jurisdiction of the decision-maker and the fairness of the decision-making process rather than whether the decision was correct’.33 Perhaps put more lucidly, Lord Bightman asserts that ‘’judicial review is not an appeal from a decision, but a review of the manner in which the decision was made’.34 To crown the distinction, Professor Hoexter submits that while an appeal is concerned with the correctness of a decision, review is concerned with whether a decision ‘was arrived at in an acceptable fashion’35 Harmoniously speaking, the court in Rustenburg Platinum Mines36 held that, review is concerned with the way in which a decision-maker arrived at a particular conclusion.37 That court, however, held that it is very difficult to draw a line between review and appeal especially because in a review under PAJA, a court must scruitinise the merits of a decision when determining its rationality.38 That court correctly concluded that it is impossible to undertake the rationality inquiry ‘without taking some account of the substantive merits of the decision’.39 It is submitted that these two concepts (appeal and review) exist on a continuum with a ‘reasonableness review’ infusing both a review and appeal element because it involves a scrutiny of merits. Indeed, and in support of this submission, Fergus

31 Ibid, para 63.

32 General Medical Council v Michalak [2017] UKSC 71, [30] (Lord Kerr).

33 Kemper Reinsurance Company v Minister of Finance [2000] 1 AC 1 (HL), 14H-15A (Lord Hoffman).

34 Chief Constable of North Wales v Evans [1982] 1 WLR 1155 (HL), 1175 (Lord Brightman).

35 Ibid (supra n 22) 137.

36 Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (598/05) [2006] ZASCA 175; [2007] 1 All SA 164 (SCA); 2007 (1) SA 576 (SCA); [2006] 11 BLLR

1021 (SCA); (2006) 27 ILJ 2076 (SCA).

37 Ibid, para 31.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

accurately observes that appeal and review cannot yield to clear definitions but are fluid concepts.40 It follows that while the distinction is easily discernible at a conceptual level, this is not the case in practice. This should not be concerning because it is consonant with the acceptance that there is no complete separation of powers and that there will be an inevitable intrusion from time to time.41 This acceptance is a necessary transformative shift from the past which required strict and formalistic classification of functions of the different arms of government which encouraged judicial timidity and pro-executive decision making in administrative law by the courts.42 This led to extreme formalism in administrative-law-adjudication pre-1994.43

It has been stated that the main reason for maintaining the distinction between appeal and review ‘is to uphold the fundamental principle of the separation of powers’.44 As shown above, this principle is not absolute. Therefore, the assertion that appeal and review exist on a continuum is supported by the fact that the principle of separation of powers itself is not absolute. Indeed, the distinction between appeal and review may be accepted as a constitutional check designed to restrain judicial power in salutation of the principle of judicial deference which lies at the heart of separation of powers. While recognizing that some functions belong to the terrain of the Executive, De Ville has strikingly contended that in the constitutional era, judicial review should be recognised, not as antagonistic, but as complementary to the administration ‘in the efficient and suitable performance of their functions’.45 In this light, Jowell convincingly argues that judicial review must not be rejected as stifling administrative efficiency but should be seen as a useful means ‘of addressing administrative incompetencies’.46 The entrenchment of the rights to administrative justice is a recognition of the latter contention.47

40 E Fergus ‘The Distinction between Appeals and Reviews - Defining the Limits of the Labour Court's Powers of Review’ Industrial Law Journal Vol. 31 1559.

41 Certification case, para 112.

42 G Quinot ‘Substantive Reasoning In Administrative-Law Adjudication’ Constitutional Court Review Vol. 3 115.

43 C Hoexter 'Judicial policy revisited: Transformative adjudication in administrative law' (2008) 24 SAJHR 281 287.

44 Ibid 1569.

45 JR de Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in SA Law (2003) 30.

46 J Jowell 'The Democratic Necessity of Administrative justice' (2006) Acta Juridica 13 17.

47 Ibid (supra n 48) 1570.

Nevertheless, the Judiciary has consistently maintained that there is a distinction between review and appeal.48 Relying on Trinity Broadcasting,49 the court held that PAJA does not extinguish the distinction between review and appeal.50 Though in Trinity Broadcasting the court held that even under reasonableness review, the test is not whether a decision is correct or not,51 the Labour Appeal Court demonstrates that it is impossible to undertake a reasonableness review without considering the merits of a decision.52

Strikingly, in Carephone,53 the Labour Appeal Court profoundly said that,

In determining whether administrative action is justifiable in terms of the reasons given for it, value judgements will have to be made which will, almost inevitably, involve the consideration of the ‘merits’ of the matter in some way or another. As long as the judge determining this issue is aware that he or she enters the merits not in order to substitute his or her opinion on the correctness thereof, but to determine whether the outcome is rationally justifiable, the process will be in order.54

This judicial statement legitimises the assertion that in its interpretation and application of the section 33 rights to administrative justice, the Judiciary has blurred the distinction between appeal and review. To check the accuracy of this assertion, it is necessary to dive into a critical analysis of court judgments and academic literature.

b) A critical review of relevant literature

In Bato Star, the Constitutional Court strikingly held that ‘the review functions of a court now have a substantive as well as a procedural ingredient’.55 This statement should not be surprising because, as Professor Hoexter convincingly asserts, ‘the focus of judicial review in administrative law frequently falls on the decision itself as opposed to the decision-making process’.56 She persuasively asserts that in some cases, it might be difficult for a court to determine the legality of

48 See Dumani v Nair and Another (144/2012) [2012] ZASCA 196; 2013 (2) SA 274 (SCA); [2013] 2 All SA 125

(SCA), para 32

49 Trinity Broadcasting (Ciskei) v Independent Communications Authority of SA 2004 (3) SA 346 (SCA).

50 Ibid, para 20.

51 Ibid.

52 Infra (n 59).

53 Carephone v Marcus NO and others (JA52/98) [1998] ZALAC 11.

54 Ibid, para 36.

55 Para 45.

56 Ibid (supra n 22) 138.

a decision without pronouncing on its merits, especially in cases relating to the reasonableness of a decision.57 Invitingly, emeritus Professor Corder has contended that an assertion that there is a distinction between appeal and review can no longer be defended, and that it is no longer necessary to defend such an assertion.58 This so because ‘our courts have now been expressly authorized to determine the reasonableness of administrative action, which must contain a merits-based substantive element’.59

On this score, professor Hoexter contends that the distinction between appeal and review reflects the principle of separation of powers to the effect that if the courts make pronouncements on the merits of administrative decisions, this would be a violation of the separation of powers.60 This distinction recognises the institutional competence of the courts whilst at the same time acknowledging the expertise of administrators to which the courts must defer.61 This was authoritatively avowed by the Constitutional Court in Trencon.62 In Trencon, the Court correctly held that where a court intends to substitute a decision of an administrator with its own, as a remedy, a court must inquire whether it is in as good a position as an administrator.63 That is, where the expertise of an administrator are still required for making a decision, a court must remit a matter to an administrator to make such a decision.64 What is more, the Constitutional Court has held that in review, a court is not called upon to pronounce on the correctness (or not) of an administrator’s decision.65 To do so, a court would be pronouncing on the merits of an administrator’s decision, and in turn, be usurping the role of an administrator. This would amount to judicial overreach in violation of the separation of powers.66

However, the erosion of the distinction between appeal and review has occurred as early as in 1996. In this instance, Kotze v Minister of Health is instructive.67 In this case, Spoelstra J held that

57 Ibid.

58 H Corder ‘Without deference, with respect: a response to Justice O’Regan’ SALJ (2004) 121, 443.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid (supra n 22) 140.

61 Ibid.

62 Trencon Construction (Pty) Limited v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited and Another (CCT198/14) [2015] ZACC 22; 2015 (5) SA 245 (CC); 2015 (10) BCLR 1199 (CC).

63 Ibid, para 47.

64 Ibid, para 48.

65 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (ibid, para 90).

66 Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) [2002] ZACC 15; 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC); 2002 (10)

BCLR 1033 (CC), para 98.

67 1996 (3) BCLR 417 (T).

section 24(d) of the Interim Constitution widened the scope of review such that the distinction between appeal and review was eroded as a review court in terms of section 24(d) was required to conclude that ‘the reasons advanced for the action under review are not supported by the facts or the law or both’.68 In support of this stated erosion, Van Deventer J69 asserted that section 24(d) entails that the ‘role of the courts in judicial review is no longer limited to the way in which an administrative decision was reached but now extends to its substance and merits’.70 One can legitimately argue that the Constitutional Court has approved of this assertion as it stated that the review functions of a court now have both ‘substantive as well as a procedural ingredient’.71 The same court in Sidumo72 affirmed that in the context of reviewing the reasonableness of a decision, it is impossible to separate merits and scrutiny.73 Thus, Professor Hoexter argues that the distinction between review and appeal can only be sustained ‘when review takes place on a technical ground such as lack of authority or failure to observe a mandatory legal requirement’.74 She convincingly states that this is so because ‘any ground of review whose establishment depends on a value judgment or any degree of judicial estimation will inevitably draw the reviewing court into the merits’.75 This is especially true in respect of reviewing the reasonableness of a decision as illustrated by the Labour Appeal Court in Carephone.76

In the context of labour-law-review of the reasonableness of a Commissioner’s award, the Constitutional Court in Sidumo conceded that a Labour Court reviewing an award by a Commissioner in the CCMA inevitably deals with the merits of the matter and that this tends to blur the distinction between appeal and review.77 In this regard, Professor Hoexter has stated that the ‘judicial scrutiny of the merits is harmless in itself’ and that ‘the main thing is that judges should not use the opportunity of scrutiny to prefer their own views as to the rightness of the decision’.78 This has been confirmed by the Constitutional Court in Trencon. However, it is

68 Ibid, page 419.

69 Roman v William NO 1997 (9) BCLR 1267 (C).

70 At 1275E-1276C.

71 Ibid (supra n 58).

72 Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others (CCT 85/06) [2007] ZACC 22; [2007] 12 BLLR 1097 (CC); 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC); 2008 (2) BCLR 158 (CC).

73 Ibid, para 108.

74 C Hoexter ‘Judicial policy revisited: transformative adjudication in administrative law’ SAJHR Vol 24, 297.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid (supra n 56).

77 Sidumo, para 109.

78 Ibid (supra n 79).

noteworthy that in the same breath, Professor Hoexter regards the distinction between appeal and review as artificial.79

In South African Arms,80 the High Court had to decide whether a chambered barrel consisting of a chamber and barrel made from a singular unitary piece of steel requires the separate engraving of a serial number on the barrel in order to comply with section 23(2) and Regulation 28 of the Firearms Control Act?81 Section 23(2) of the Firearms Control Act (the Act), read with Regulation 28 of the Regulation of the Firearms Control, states that ‘the identification number must be stamped and the mark affixed in the prescribed manner on the barrel and the frame, or the barrel and the receiver, of the firearm’.82 According to the Act, firearms imported into South Africa must pass by the OR Tambo International Airport for the purpose of ensuring that they comply with, inter alia, the requirements of section 23(2) of the Act and Regulation 28. The Central Firearms Registry (the Registry) is authorized to ensure this compliance. In this case, the Head of the Registry sent the Applicants a section 23 notice indicating that the firearms did not comply with the requirements of section 23 of the Act.83 The manner of engravement of a serial number prescribed by the Act and the Regulations is to ensure efficient inspections of firearms by the Registry. This is in line with section 33 of the Constitution which requires efficient administration.

The Registry’s decision not to permit the Applicants to sell these firearms which are non-compliant with the requirements of the Act and the Regulations is administrative action since it was taken by the Registry in the course of ‘carrying out the daily functions of the state which necessarily involves the application of policy, usually after its translation into law, with direct and immediate consequences for individuals or groups of individuals’.84 In concluding that the firearms complied with section 23(2) of the and Regulation 28, the Court held that it was confronted with a ‘simple matter of pure legal interpretation’ and that a declarator to the effect that the firearms are compliant would not infringe the principle of separation of powers.85 The respondent State parties argued that

79 Ibid.

80 South African Arms and Ammunition Dealers' Association NPO and Others v Sikhakhane Head: Central Firearms Registry and Others [146697-2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 61.

81 Ibid, para 9.

82 60 of 2000.

83 South African Arms, para 23.

84 Greys Marine, para 24.

85 Para 48.

the Applicants’ interpretation of section 23 and Regulation 28 to the effect of the court’s finding ‘amounted to legislation through court proceedings’.86 By highlighting that its conclusion does not infringe on the principle of separation of powers, the court acknowledges the Respondents’ above contention. It is submitted that the court, in rushing to override the Head’s decision finding the firearms were not in compliance with the requirements of the Act, usurped the Head’s administrative powers in violation of the principle in Trencon wherein it was stated that a court can substitute an administrator’s decision only if the court was in as good a position as an administrator to do so. In this case, the court was obligated to find whether the Head’s decision was procedurally flawed and not pronounce on the correctness of the Head’s decision. That is a function of an appeal, and not a review court. However, the erosion of the distinction between appeal and review explains this judicial interference,87 oftentimes, in violation of the principle of separation of powers.

IV. CONCLUSION

The distinction between review and appeal is in furtherance of the principle of the separation of powers. However, because this principle is not absolute, similarly, review and appeal overlap and do not exist parallel to each other. This essay established that while the distinction between appeal and review is easily visible at a conceptual level, it is not easy draw such a distinction in practice. Various judgments, coupled with academic commentary, show that the distinction between appeal and review is artificial and can no longer be sustained because review under administrative law inevitably requires a reviewing court to consider the merits of a decision under review. It is evident that the consideration of merits in itself is not a problem. In my view, the resultant blurring of the distinction between review and appeal is not occasioned by the courts, per se, but is a consequence of the post-1994 constitutional design.

Total words = 4 339

86 Para 47.

87 MJ Boyens and A Van der Walt ‘Sidumo revisited - the judgment of the constitutional court’ Obiter Vol. 36, No. 2 349.

Bibliography

Books

C Hoexter and G Penfold Administrative Law in South Africa 3 ed (2021)

Cases

Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others (CCT 27/03) [2004] ZACC 15; 2004 (4) SA 460 (CC); 2004 (7) BCLR 687 (CC).

Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1666 (CCT 23/66) [1666] ZACC 26; 1666 (4)

SA 744 (CC); 1666 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC); (1666) 17 ILJ 821 (CC).

Chief Constable of North Wales v Evans [1682] 1 WLR 1155 (HL), 1175 (Lord Brightman).

Carephone v Marcus NO and others (JA52/68) [1668] ZALAC 11.

Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly & Others [2006] ZACC 11, 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC).

Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (CCT35/66) [2000] ZACC 8; 2000

(3) SA 636; 2000 (8) BCLR 837.

Dumani v Nair and Another (144/2012) [2012] ZASCA 166; 2013 (2) SA 274 (SCA); [2013] 2 All SA 125 (SCA).

Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan Council and Others (CCT7/68) [1668] ZACC 17; 1666 (1) SA 374; 1668 (12) BCLR 1458.

6. Greys Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of Public Works and Others (347/2004) [2005] ZASCA 43; [2005] 3 All SA 33 (SCA); 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA); 2005 (10) BCLR 631 (SCA).

General Medical Council v Michalak [2017] UKSC 71, [30] (Lord Kerr).

Kemper Reinsurance Company v Minister of Finance [2000] 1 AC 1 (HL).

Kotzé v Minister of Health and Another 1666 (3) BCLR 417 (T).

Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO and Others 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA).

Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others v Phambili Fisheries (Pty) Ltd and Another

(32/2003, 40/2003) [2003] ZASCA 46; [2003] 2 All SA 616 (SCA); 2003 (6) SA 407 (SCA).

Mwelase and Others v Director-General for the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform and Another (CCT 232/18) [2016] ZACC 30; 2016 (11) BCLR 1358 (CC); 2016 (6) SA 567 (CC).

Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Motau and Others (CCT 133/13) [2014] ZACC 18; 2014 (8) BCLR 630 (CC); 2014 (5) SA 66 (CC).

Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others (CCT 56/2004) [2005] ZACC 14; 2006 (2) SA 311 (CC); 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC).

Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (No 2) [2002] ZACC 15; 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC); 2002 (10)

BCLR 1033 (CC).

16. National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others (CCT 38/12) [2012] ZACC 18; 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC); 2012 (11) BCLR 1148 (CC).

Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of South Africa

2000 (2) SA 674 (CC).

Roman v William NO 1667 (6) BCLR 1267 (C).

Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd (Rustenburg Section) v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (568/05) [2006] ZASCA 175; [2007] 1 All SA 164 (SCA); 2007 (1) SA 576 (SCA);

[2006] 11 BLLR 1021 (SCA); (2006) 27 ILJ 2076 (SCA).

Sidumo and Another v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd and Others (CCT 85/06) [2007] ZACC 22; [2007] 12 BLLR 1067 (CC); 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC); 2008 (2) BCLR 158 (CC).

South African Arms and Ammunition Dealers' Association NPO and Others v Sikhakhane Head: Central Firearms Registry and Others [146667-2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 61.

S v Dodo [2001] ZACC 16; 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC); 2001 (5) BCLR 423 (CC).

Trencon Construction (Pty) Limited v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Limited and Another (CCT168/14) [2015] ZACC 22; 2015 (5) SA 245 (CC); 2015 (10) BCLR 1166 (CC).

Trinity Broadcasting (Ciskei) v Independent Communications Authority of SA 2004 (3) SA 346 (SCA).

United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (CCT86/17) [2017] ZACC 21; 2017 (8) BCLR 1061 (CC); 2017 (5) SA 300 (CC)

Journal articles

C Hoexter ‘Judicial policy revisited: transformative adjudication in administrative law’ SAJHR Vol 24, 267.

C Hoexter ‘The Future of Judicial Review in South African Administrative Law (2000) 117 SALJ 484.

C Hoexter 'Judicial policy revisited: Transformative adjudication in administrative law' (2008) 24 SAJHR 281

E Fergus ‘The Distinction between Appeals and Reviews - Defining the Limits of the Labour Court's Powers of Review’ Industrial Law Journal Vol. 31 1556.

G.E Devenish ‘The doctrine of separation of powers with special reference to events in South Africa and Zimbabwe.’ Tydskrif vir Hedendaagse Romeins Hollandse Reg 66 (1).

G Quinot ‘Substantive Reasoning In Administrative-Law Adjudication’ Constitutional Court Review Vol. 3 115.

H Corder ‘Without deference, with respect: a response to Justice O’Regan’ SALJ (2004) 121, 443.

JR de Ville Judicial Review of Administrative Action in SA Law (2003).

6. J Jowell 'The Democratic Necessity of Administrative justice' (2006) Acta Juridica 13.

10. MJ Boyens and A Van der Walt ‘Sidumo revisited - the judgment of the constitutional court’ Obiter Vol. 36, No. 2 346.

11. P Labuschagne ‘Trias politica as guiding constitutional principle in the modern state: Obsolete relic or

constitutional necessity?’ Politeia Vol 25 No. 1.

Legislation

Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1666.

Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000.

Theses

G Penfold Towards a substantive conception of the scope of administrative-law review in South Africa PhD thesis (Wits University, Johannesburg) 2020.