Legal Insight · Constitutional & Administrative Law

HOW POLITICAL PARTIES ARE SUPPOSED TO FUNCTION IN A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY: A FOCUS ON SOUTH AFRICA’S MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES

TSHEPAHALO MASAKOANA
LLB Wits | LLM UCT (Constitutional and Administrative Law)
Director, Legal Consultant & Legal Educator, Masakoana Law

I. INTRODUCTION

There are two purposes of this discussion paper. First, this discussion paper briefly explains how, according to Khaitan, political parties are supposed to function in a constitutional democracy. This is done through a primary reliance on Tarunabh Khaitan’s article.[1] Secondly, this paper assesses the extent to which South Africa’s main political parties measure up to this idealised account/threshold proposed by Khaitan. Notably, this standard that is supposed to be met by these political parties is an idealised account provided by Khaitan.[2] Section two of this paper outlines the idealised account by Khaitan. The third section examines to what extent have South Africa’s main political parties met this standard and concludes.

II. KHAITAN’S IDEALISED ACCOUNT OF HOW POLITICAL PARTIES ARE SUPPOSED TO FUNCTION

Khaitan accurately asserts that political parties have emerged as the main, and arguably indispensable, vehicle in facilitating successful representative democratic elections in complex modern states.[3] Consequently, the level of autonomy enjoyed by political parties is one of the markers of the health of a democracy.[4] He convincingly maintains that the central function of a political party is to organise popular will and thereby make democratic functioning possible.[5] A major contention in Khaitan’s paper is that the key democratic function of political parties is to act as intermediaries between the state and its people in a representative democracy.[6]

In expanding on the role of political parties as intermediaries, Khaitan states that this intermediary function is two-charactered: the biodirectionality and the plenary character.[7] The biodirectionality element emphasises a political party’s functional role of “imbibing” and influencing popular will and in turn, formulating and justifying its proposed policy packages.[8] Khaitan persuasively argues that popular opinion and political party’s policy package speak to and inform one another as political parties translate popular opinion into policy and sometimes, parties formulate policy proposals and influence popular opinion.[9]

On the plenary character, political parties formulate policies on a wide range of issues affecting people such that they sell these politically as a package to the people. Khaitan characterises such political parties as drivers of governments-in-waiting, and serious political parties.[10] Seriousness, according to Khaitan, is a measure of the party’s intention to play the requisite intermediary role between the state and its people.[11]

Khaitan concedes that a political party is incapable of committing itself to all the values and preferences of all the people in a diverse society.[12] That is a necessary and inescapable concession. However, Khaitan correctly argues that, a political group which dismisses the interests of any section of the population as irrelevant to its policy consideration, is a faction and not a (political) party.[13] Khaitan contends that a non-factional party should sincerely attempt to synthesise the interest of all the people in its polity because a party must commit itself to the rule of all the people and not a section thereof.[14]

Additionally, Khaitan states that serious political parties strengthen representative democracy by reducing four information and transaction costs, namely the political participation costs and the voters’ information costs, together with policy packaging costs and ally prediction costs for state institutions.[15] By political party participation cost, Khaitan simply means that there is a need for healthy (and indeed, serious) political parties which will be the vehicle to consolidate and champion the interests of the electorate, instead of an individual person having to personally champion all their needs as this is very costly.[16]

Voter information cost emphasises the need for voter education. Political parties must supply sufficient information and be transparent enough for a reasonably diligent voter to make informed choices, when voting, without putting too much effort.[17] Furthermore, policy packaging costs entail the fundamental need for parties to declare information about their policies, whether they win elections or not. This puts voters in a situation where they know what they will and will not get in voting for a particular party, and this in turn helps to legitimize the state’s policies to its people.[18] Finally, parties reduce ally prediction costs to other parties and state institutions “by indicating to them which office-holders are likely to be persuadable political allies, whose support can be taken for granted, and who are likely to oppose certain policy proposals”.[19]

III. THE EXTENT TO WHICH SOUTH AFRICA’S MAIN POLITICAL PARTIES MEASURE UP TO THIS IDEALISED ACCOUNT

In this paper, I will only focus on four main political parties namely, Arican National Congress (ANC); Democratic Alliance (DA); uMkhonto Wesizwe (MK) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF). Have these political parties performed the function of being intermediaries between the state and its people in a representative democracy by way of translating popular will into policy? One should pause and ask: but what is the popular will in South Africa? Popular will is not clear-cut, but several elements that constitute popular will can be distilled. Equitable access to land; access to higher education and healthcare; basic service delivery; job creation and industrialisation are but some of these elements.

In South Africa, landownership disparities remain intact, with the landless languishing in poverty, while the select few own major portions of the land. Concerningly, every year there are student protest occasioned by lack of funding, limited spaces in institutions of higher learning and thus, limited access to higher education despite merit. In the townships, the state of healthcare service is extremely bad whilst basic service delivery is simultaneously and outrageously declining. There are no jobs, and the unemployment rate increases as economic catastrophes, like the VAT increase, remain prevalent. This indicates a failure to translates popular will into policy. It is inescapable for me to accept that there are good policies on paper, but the lack of implementation cannot e ignored.

While the ally prediction cost and voter participation are low, this paper asserts that the voter information cost is particularly hight. This paper considers policy packaging cost as also low because of the intensity of political engagement in South Africa. Consequently, this paper asserts that the main political parties in South have not seriously measured up to the idealised account set out by Khaitan. However, this is not to discount all their efforts as immaterial.

IV. CONCLUSION

An overriding theme evident here is that the main function of a serious political party is to organise popular will and translate it to policy. This means that a political party must play a role of an intermediary between the state and its people. Secondly, this paper has assessed the extent to which South Africa’s main political parties (ANC; DA; MK and EFF) have measured up to this idealised account. This paper argued that the main political parties in South Africa have not seriously measured up to this account. However, Khaitan accurately asserts that the fact that we may never fully achieve an ideal is not a reason to give up on trying to realise them as far as possible.[20]

REFERENCES

[1] Tarunabh Khaitan “Political Parties in Constitutional Theory” vol. 73 (2020) Current Legal Problems 89-125.

[2] Ibid, p. 91.

[3] Ibid (supra n 1), p. 94.

[4] Ibid (supra n 1), p. 90.

[5] Ibid (supra n 2).

[6] Ibid (supra n 1), p. 93.

[7] Ibid (supra n 3).

[8] Ibid (supra n 1), p. 95.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid (supra n 1), p. 97.

[11] Ibid (supra n 1), p. 107.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Ibid (supra n 1), p. 103.

[16] Ibid (supra n 1), p. 99.

[17] Ibid (supra n 1), p. 100.

[18] Ibid (supra n 1), p. 101.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid (supra n1), p. 94.